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I. INTRODUCTION
The fight against terrorism is doubtless a necessary and urgent
undertaking, as well as one that evades more traditional forms of
attack. As the government continues to expand its powers to go
after terrorists and their supporters, questions arise as to whether
and to what extent the government may infringe upon the
constitutional rights of citizens in order to achieve the goal of
ending terrorist attacks. One of the most frequently used methods
t Katherine Zerwas is aJ.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law,
2012; B.A., American Studies, Carleton College, 2006.
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of prosecuting terrorism is under a statute' that makes it a crime to
provide material support to terrorist organizations. But, the
statute's constitutionality has been challenged on the grounds that
it violates the rights of a donor of support to free speech and
association, and lacks adequate due process procedures.
This note examines one specific challenge to the material
support statute. Humanitarian Law Project v. HolderW represents the
culmination of a twelve-year legal battle challenging the
constitutionality of the material support statute. First, this note
will explore the history and evolution of the material support
statute along with early legal challenges. Next, it will examine the
specific facts of the plaintiffs' case in Humanitarian Law Project, as
well as the plaintiffs' specific legal arguments. Then, it will
describe the opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court and
compare it to the dissent's opinion.
This note argues that both the majority and the dissent made
critical analytical errors. First, I argue that both the majority and
the dissent mishandled the Fifth Amendment analysis. Second, I
assert that the majority should have addressed the plaintiffs'
overbreadth challenge. Finally, I conclude that future litigants are
not foreclosed from bringing an overbreadth challenge to the
material support statute.
II. HISTORY
A. 18 U.S.C. Section 2339B
Following the World Trade Center bombings in 1993,
Congress passed a series of bills aimed at curtailing economic
support to terrorist activities.5 One of these, codified at 18 U.S.C. §
2339A, prohibited the provision of "material support or
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006).
2. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Mens Rea for the Crime of Providing Material
Resources to a Foreign Terrorist Organization, 56 BAYLOR L. REv. 861, 862 (2004)
(noting that nearly every terrorism prosecution since 9/11 has included a charge
of material support to terrorist organizations).
3. 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010).
4. Id. at 2716.
5. David Henrik Pendle, Charity of the Heart and Sword: The Material Support
Offense and Personal Guilt, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 777, 783 (2007) (arguing that a
recklessness standard is the most appropriate fit to § 2339B because it passes
constitutional muster under Scales while still preserving the government's ability to
deter support for terrorism).
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resources ... knowing or intending that they are to be used ...
6
[to] violat[e]" any of several offenses. Material support was
defined as:
[A] ny property, tangible or intangible, or service,
including currency or monetary instruments or financial
securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert
advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.
Section 2339A contained several prosecutorial hurdles,"
however, which led Congress to amend the statute following the
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City in
1995.9 As amended, the statute created a new material support
provision codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B as well as a foreign-terrorist
designation scheme codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1189.10
Once designated as foreign terrorist organization (FTO),
section 2339B makes it a criminal offense to provide material
support to that organization or persons affiliated with it. As the
statute was originally written, a person violated the statute by
knowingly providing material support or resources (as defined by
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006).
7. Id. § 2339A(b) (1).
8. One commentator identified two significant hurdles: First, section 2339A
required a finding of specific intent, which meant that the prosecution had to
show the donor intended the donation to be used to further some illegal purpose.
Pendle, supra note 5, at 783. Second, it required the prosecution to relate the
offense back to some specific act of terrorism. Id.
9. Id. at 784.
10. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, PUB. L.
No. 104-132, 112 STAT. 1214; see Benjamin Yaster, Resetting Scales: An Examination of
Due Process Rights in Material Support Prosecutions, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1353, 1363
(2008). Under section 1189, Congress gave the Secretary of State the authority to
designate certain foreign groups as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) which
would subject them to several restrictions, including the freezing of domestic
assets and barring its representatives from entering the United States. 18 U.S.C. §
1189 (2006). In order to be designated an FTO, the Secretary of State would have
to find that (1) the group is a "foreign organization," (2) that it engages in
"terrorist activity . . . or terrorism," or has "the capability and intent to engage in
terrorist activity or terrorism," and, (3) it "threatens the security of United States
nationals or the national security of the United States." Id. § 1189(a) (1).
Organizations designated as an FTO have the right to an administrative review of
their status, which, if denied can be requested again once every two years. Id. §
1189(a) (4) (B).
53392011]
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section 2339A) to an FFO." While the statute originally called for
a maximum of a ten-year prison sentence, Congress amended the
statute in 2001 with the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) to increase the sentence to
fifteen years, or to life in prison if a death results from the
.12violation.
Questions soon arose as to what Congress intended by
requiring that a donor "knowingly" provide material support to an
FTO in order to violate the statute. Does "knowingly" modify
"material support" or "to a foreign terrorist organization" or, does
it merely modify "provides?"1 Three statutory interpretations were
proposed: (1) a strict-liability standard, whereby the statute is
violated any time someone consciously provides material support
when that support goes to an FTO regardless of whether the donor
knew the recipient was an FTO; (2) a knowledge requirement,
whereby the statute is not violated unless the donor had actual
knowledge that the organization was designated an FTO; or (3) a
specific-intent standard, which requires that the donor give support
with the purpose of aiding illegal activities. 4  These various
interpretations of the meaning of section 2339B were tested in a
series of court cases.
B. Earlier Cases Interpreting Section 2339B
Challenges to section 2339B began with the plaintiffs whose
case is the subject of this note. In 1998, Humanitarian Law Project
(HLP), HLP's president, a physician, and five other nonprofit
groups filed suit in federal court in the central district of California
challenging the constitutionality of the statute.' Plaintiffs sought
to enjoin enforcement of the statute against their activities, which
were intended to provide humanitarian and political support to
two organizations designated as FTOs.'5 The plaintiffs asserted that
certain terms in the definition of material support were
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (1) (2006).
12. Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools
Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001,
PUB. L.No. 107-56, § 810(d), 115 Stat. 272, 380.
13. Jonakait, supra note 2, at 873.
14. Pendle, supra note 5, at 784-85.
15. Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2713-14 (2010).
16. Id. at 2714.
5340 [Vol. 37:5
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unconstitutionally vague and that as applied to them the statute's
penalties constituted guilt by association since the statute contained
no specific-intent provision.'7  The district court granted the
injunction in part on the grounds that the terms "personnel" and
"training" within the definition of material support were
unconstitutionally vague. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court.9 It held that not only were the
challenged terms unconstitutionally vague,2o but also that the
Government's interpretation of the statute as requiring neither
knowledge nor intent to lend support to a terrorist organization
was unconstitutional.2 ' Following a line of cases that construed
criminal statutes as requiring at a minimum a showing of intent
where Congress failed to include one, the Court of Appeals
interpreted section 2339B as requiring that "a defendant knew of
the organization's designation as a terrorist organization or proof
that a defendant knew of the unlawful activities that caused it to be
so designated."22
Just as the Ninth Circuit was about to grant a rehearing of the
three-judge panel decision in 2003, Congress amended section
2339B to include a knowledge standard that mirrored the Ninth
Circuit's standard. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) amended section 2339B to read:
To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge
that the organization is a designated terrorist
organization . . . that the organization has engaged or
engages in terrorist activity ... or that the organization
24has engaged or engages in terrorism ....
Congress also sought to clarify the definitions of material
support deemed unconstitutionally vague by the Ninth Circuit. It
added to the definition of material support in section 2339A the
term "service."2 It defined training to mean "instruction or
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d
382, 385 (9th Cir. 2003).
20. Humanitarian Law Project, 352 F.3d at 403.
21. Humanitarian Law Project, 352 F.3d at 397.
22. Humanitarian Law Project, 352 F.3d at 400.
23. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. at 2715; see also Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 § 6603, 118 Stat. 3638,
3762-64 (2004).
24. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § 6603.
25. Id. § 6603(b) (1).
2011] 5341
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teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general
knowledge." Expert advice or assistance was further defined to
mean "advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or
other specialized knowledge. Finally, personnel was defined in
such a way as to make an important distinction between actions
that are undertaken independently of the FITO and those which are
done in coordination with them:
No person may be prosecuted under [section 2339B] in
connection with the term "personnel" unless that person
has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or
conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with
1 or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to
work under that terrorist organization's direction or
control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise
direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who
act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist
organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be
considered to be working under the foreign terrorist
281organization's direction and control.
In response to these statutory changes, the Ninth Circuit
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings on
the question of the vagueness of the statute's terms. At this point,
the district court consolidated the plaintiffs' claims with a separate
case the plaintiffs had filed to challenge the addition of the term
"expert advice and assistance" pursuant to a 2001 amendment of
section 2339B.so The district court also permitted the plaintiffs to
challenge the addition of the term service to the definition of
material support." The district court once again granted a partial
26. Id. § 6603(b) (2).
27. Id. § 6603(b) (3).
28. Id. § 6603(h).
29. Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2010).
30. Id. In 2001, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT act which amended the
definition of material support in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) to include the term "expert
advice or assistance." Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing
Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 805(a) (2) (B), 115 Stat. 272, 377.
The Humanitarian Law Project plaintiffs filed another lawsuit in 2003 challenging
this additional term in the statute. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F.
Supp. 2d 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2004). This case along with the earlier case challenging
the terms "training" and "personnel" were consolidated. Humanitarian Law
Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
31. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 n.24.
5342 [Vol. 37:5
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injunction to the plaintiffs on vagueness grounds. The Ninth
Circuit took up the appeal once again.
This time around, the Ninth Circuit was not persuaded that
the statute's mens rea requirement, as amended, failed to pass
constitutional muster.3 However, the court agreed with the district
court that the definitions of training, expert advice or assistance,
and service were unconstitutionally vague as applied to the
plaintiffs since these terms covered constitutionally protected forms
of speech.5 Finally, the Supreme Court granted the Government's
petition for certiorari.
III. HOLDER V. HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT
A. Facts
The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunction to
stop the enforcement of section 2339B against their attempts to
provide humanitarian support to two FTOs, the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) .
32. Id. at 1156.
33. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009), affd
in part and rev'd in part, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712
(2010).
34. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that "guilt is personal." Id. at 925 (citing
Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488, 495 (9th Cir. 1964)). But, the Court noted
that:
[S]ection 2339A already requires the government to prove that the
donor defendant provided "material support or resources" to a
designated foreign terrorist organization with knowledge that the donee
organization is a designated foreign terrorist organization, or with
knowledge that the organization is or has engaged in terrorist activities or
terrorism. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a). As amended, AEDPA section 2339B(a)
complies with the "conventional requirement for criminal conduct-
awareness of some wrongdoing."
Id. at 926 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606-07 (1994)).
35. The Ninth Circuit concluded that even if reasonable persons could
distinguish between permissible and impermissible types of training, the term is
still unconstitutional since "[it] could still be read to encompass speech and
advocacy protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 929. Similarly, citing the fact
that "expert advice or assistance" was said to illegalize the filing of an amicus brief
on behalf of an FTO litigant at oral argument, the Ninth Circuit ruled that this
term is also unconstitutionally vague since "[it] continues to cover constitutionally
protected advocacy." Id. at 930. Finally, "service" was also held unconstitutional
because "it is easy to imagine protected expression that falls within the bounds of
the term 'service."' Id. (citing Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1152).
36. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 48 (2009).
37. Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2713-14 (2010).
53432011]
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Both the PKK and the LTTE were organizations that had been
linked to terrorist activities, but also had as their mission the
establishment of an independent state and the provision of
humanitarian support for their respective ethnic groups that had
historically been the victims of oppression.3 According to the
plaintiffs, the activities they planned to undertake (but feared
would be barred by section 2339B) included training members of
these groups in humanitarian and international law, and engaging
in political advocacy on their behalf. The plaintiffs had no design
to further the illegal activities of either the PKK or the LTTE.
B. Plaintiffs' Legal Challenges to Section 2339B
In their legal challenge, the plaintiffs argued that section
38. The mission of the PKK is to "establish an independent, democratic
Kurdish state in the Middle East." Pendle, supra note 5, at 780 (citing FED'N AM.
SCIENTISTS, INTELLIGENCE RESOURCE PROGRAM, KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK),
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/pkk.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007)). Since
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds have been stateless. They have
been forced by various states to stop speaking their language or stop wearing their
traditional clothing, and have further been subjected to "outright annihilation."
Id. The PKK has been involved in rural-based insurgency activities but have also
sponsored international political forums, peace conferences, and Kurdish cultural
festivals, as well as setting up their own quasigovernmental structure in parts of
Turkey. Id. at 781 (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 389 (9th Cir. 2003). Similarly, the LTTE seeks to protect the
human rights of Tamils in Sri Lanka and achieve self-determination and has set up
a governmental structure for over 500,000 Tamils. Id. (quoting Dep't ofJustice, 352
F.3d at 390).
39. The Ninth Circuit described the plaintiffs' intended activities as follows:
Plaintiffs who support PKK want: (1) to train members of PKK on how to
use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes,
(2) to engage in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds who live in Turkey,
and (3) to teach PKK members how to petition various representative
bodies such as the United Nations for relief.
Plaintiffs who support LTTE want: (1) to train members of LTTE to
present claims for tsunami-related aid to mediators and international
bodies, (2) to offer their legal expertise in negotiating peace agreements
between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, and (3) to engage in
political advocacy on behalf of Tamils who live in Sri Lanka.
Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 921 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).
However, much of the aid intended for the LTTE was taken off the table in
response to a military defeat leaving the LTTE with "no role in Sri Lanka." Holder,
130 S.Ct. at 2716-17 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Holder 130 S.Ct.
2705 (2010) (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89)).
40. Id. at 2717.
5344 [Vol. 37:5
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2339B violated their constitutional rights insofar as it (1) violated
their Fifth Amendment right to due process and fair notice, (2)
violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech, 42 and
(3) violated their First Amendment right to freedom of
association. The plaintiffs further contended that if the Court
were to adopt a more stringent mens rea requirement, the Court
could avoid the constitutional questions altogether.44
Under the Fifth Amendment, a statute must provide fair notice
to all persons that certain conduct they might wish to engage in
45would be a violation of statute. Furthermore, where a statute
interferes with the right of free speech or association protected
under the First Amendment, a more stringent test generally should
be applied.6  To the extent that the definitional terms in section
2339B, and those terms borrowed from section 2339A, set up an
unclear distinction between what is general and what is specific
support, and also between what is coordinated and what is
independent support, the plaintiffs argued that the statute cannot
survive judicial review. Moreover, since the statute restricts
otherwise protected speech, it would have to survive the application
of a very strict standard of clarity.
In support of the assertion that section 2339B impermissibly
restricts their freedom of speech, the plaintiffs argued that the
statute as applied to their activities amounted to a content-based
speech restriction, even though the law on its face appears to apply
41. See Reply Brief for Humanitarian Law Project at 7, 9-10, 12-15, Holder, 130
S.Ct. 2705 (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89).
42. See Reply Brief for Humanitarian Law Project at 26-27, Holder, 130 S.Ct.
2705 (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89).
43. See Reply Brief for Humanitarian Law Project, supra note 41, at 36.
44. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court's prudential doctrine of
constitutional avoidance to urge the Court to narrow the statute's application by
requiring a stricter mens rea requirement. Reply Brief for Humanitarian Law
Project, supra note 41, at 39-40. The specific standard the plaintiffs sought to
include in the statute was that section 2339B should require "proof of intent to
further a designated group's terrorist activities when applied to speech." Id. at 39.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 286 (2008) ("A conviction
fails to comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to
provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory
enforcement.").
46. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 499 (1982) ("[T]he most important factor affecting the clarity that the
Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights. If, for example, the law interferes with the right
of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.").
2011] 5345
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only to otherwise unprotected conduct. Such content-based
48
restrictions merit strict scrutiny. The plaintiffs argued that section
2339B cannot survive strict scrutiny since the government cannot
justify a restriction on speech which is not intended to incite
violence. 9
The plaintiffs further argued that section 2339B violated their
First Amendment right to freely associate.5o First, they argued that
section 2339B impermissibly makes it a crime to associate with
51
designated organizations. Second, they argued that the statute
operates on the basis of guilt by association, which is prohibited by
both the First and Fifth Amendments.
Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that all these constitutional issues
could be avoided if only the Court would adopt a stricter mens rea
requirement which would so limit the scope of the statute's
application so as to make the regulation conform to constitutional
principles. Were the Court to grant the plaintiffs injunctive relief
based upon statutory grounds, the Court would not need to decide
the constitutionality of section 2339B.5 3 According to the plaintiffs,
a decision to reinterpret the mens rea standard to avoid the
constitutional questions would be consistent with the canon of
constitutional avoidance. 4 Moreover, the Court has previously
47. The government took the position that section 2339B in no way was a
restriction on speech since all it did was prohibit the donation of material support.
48. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding where a statute
appears on its face only to restrict non-speech conduct, if it incidentally restricts
speech it still must be reviewed using strict scrutiny).
49. Relying on the case of Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994),
the plaintiffs asserted that in order to survive a constitutional challenge, the
proponent of a statute must show that the statute seeks to remedy real, not merely
conjectural harms, and that "the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a
direct and meaningful way." Id. at 664.
50. Reply Brief for Humanitarian Law Project, supra note 41, at 36.
51. The plaintiffs relied upon the case of Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937) to support their argument that section 2339B impermissibly prohibits
constitutionally protected assembly. Reply Brief for Humanitarian Law Project,
supra note 41, at 37.
52. Reply Brief for Humanitarian Law Project, supra note 41, at 39-42.
53. Id. at 40.
54. Id. The plaintiffs cited EdwardJ DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) for the proposition that the Court
traditional will avoid constitutional questions whenever possible. Id. at 39 n.19.
"As was stated in Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895), "the
elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to,
in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality." This approach not
only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be
needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court,
5346 [Vol. 37:5
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interpreted statutes lacking a strict mens rea requirement to
include one in order to save it from attack on constitutional
grounds.
C. Majority Opinion
These arguments held little sway over the majority of the
Court, however. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
disagreed that the Court had any obligation to interpret the statute
to include a heightened mens rea requirement since that language
56simply wasn't in the statute. Furthermore, he concluded that
section 2339B did not violate the plaintiffs' due process rights
through guilt by association because the statute did not prohibit
57mere membership in a group. He went on to state that the
plaintiffs' other Fifth Amendment claim for vagueness lacked merit
because the statute's terms were clear enough to provide fair notice
to persons of ordinary intelligence. According to the Chief
Justice, the revisions codified by Congress in the 2003 amendments
to the statute rendered the statute sufficiently clear so as to provide
proper notice as required under due process.
is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts
will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe
constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally
forbidden it."
Id. at 575.
55. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). The Court held that although
the Smith Act did not expressly include a mens rea requirement to show the
defendant acted with a specific intent to further the illegal aims of the
organization that such a requirement could be inferred in order to make the
statute constitutional. Id. at 222.
56. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2717 (2010).
57. Id. at 2718.
58. Id. at 2720. Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts cited the plaintiffs' use of
the terms "training" and "expert advice" at oral argument, "demonstrating that
these common terms readily and naturally cover plaintiffs conduct." Id. at 2721.
59. Id. at 2720. According to the majority of the Court, the plaintiffs'
proposed activities fell squarely within these statutorily defined categories of
prohibited actions. Holder, 130 S.Ct. at 2720-22. The Court applied a sort of
reasonable-person standard to determine whether each term captured the
plaintiffs' activities. Id. Hence, training fit with "instruction on resolving disputes
through international law" because it "imparts a 'specific skill,' not 'general
knowledge."' Id. at 2720. And expert advice fit with "teaching . .. to petition for
humanitarian relief' because this involves "advice derived from . .. 'specialized
knowledge.'" Id. However, the plaintiffs failed to describe their activities with
regard to the terms "personnel" and "service" in sufficient enough detail for the
court to make any determinations based upon a pre-enforcement challenge. Id. at
2722. Nevertheless, the Court stated that both terms either expressly or impliedly
2011] 5347
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However, the Court agreed with the plaintiffs that section
2339B, as applied to the plaintiffs, amounted to a content-based
restriction on speech, which would require the application of strict
scrutiny.6 The Court expressed little doubt that fighting terrorism
is a sufficiently compelling state interest to satisfy the first part of
the strict scrutiny test.61 Turning to the second part of the test,
whether the statute is narrowly tailored, the Court gave broad
deference to Congress and the executive branch in its appraisal of
whether section 2339B is a necessary weapon in the arsenal against
terrorism. While recognizing that the impact of humanitarian aid
,,63
on FTOs is an "empirical question, the Court in fact based its
evaluation of section 2339B on little other than the bare assertions
found in certain congressional findings," statements of support
65 
"6pr
from the State Department, and a kind of "common sense. The
Court ultimately based its finding that the law was narrowly tailored
on a tautology: the law was passed because it was necessary and it
could not have been necessary were it not narrowly tailored.
Therefore, humanitarian aid must be fungible, otherwise the
government wouldn't have prohibited it. Similarly, the Court held
that section 2339B did not infringe the plaintiffs' right of
only covered those activities that are performed "in coordination with, or at the
direction of, a foreign terrorist organization." Id.
60. Id. at 2723. Specifically, the Court agreed with the plaintiffs that section
2339B fell into the same category of as the statute at issue in Cohen. Id. at 2724.
61. Id. at 2724 ("[T]he Government's interest in combating terrorism is an
urgent objective of the highest order.").
62. Id. at 2727.
63. Id. at 2724.
64. Id. A critical finding often invoked by proponents of section 2339B is the
statement by Congress that "foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity
are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an
organization facilitates that conduct." Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301 (a) (7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247. The Court
relied upon this statement as well as the fact that when Congress enacted section
2339B it repealed an exception for humanitarian aid found in section 2339A to
conclude that Congress intended to prohibit the plaintiffs' activities. Holder, 130
S.Ct. at 2725.
65. Id. at 2727. The Court relies upon an affidavit from the State Department
in which the department expresses "strong[] support" for Congress's findings and
the regulatory scheme embodied by section 2339B and related provisions. Id.
According to the State Department, "it is highly likely that any material support to
[FTOs] will ultimately inure to the benefit of their criminal, terrorist functions-
regardless of whether such support was ostensibly intended to support non-violent,
non-terrorist activities." Id. (quoting McKune Affidavit at 133, 8 Holder, 130 S.Ct.
2705 (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89)).
66. Holder, 130 S.Ct. at 2726 n.6.
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association since the law exempted mere membership, albeit while
67
prohibiting most forms of active membership.
D. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer, writing on behalf of himself and Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor, took issue with the majority's deference
to the executive and legislative branches.8 The dissent argued that
it was the duty of the judiciary in this case to determine whether
"the application of the statute to the protected activities before us
help achieve that important security-related end[.]"69 The dissent
examined two main arguments put forth by the Government: (1)
that such material support is fungible, and (2) that this support
legitimizes and thereby strengthens FTOs.o
As to the first argument, the dissent found no compelling
evidence that such humanitarian aid is fungible, all common sense
aside.! As to the second argument, the dissent pointed out that
the statute does nothing to curtail legitimizing FTOs, and even if it
did there is no reason that such a restriction could be viewed as
72constitutional. Both the Government and the majority of the
Court emphasized that the statute does not prohibit membership
in an FT0 or independent advocacy on behalf of an FT0, both of
73
which could logically further the legitimacy of an organization.
Moreover, First Amendment challenges would never be won if a
legitimizing effect would constitute sufficient grounds for dismissal,
since "[s]peech, association, and related activities on behalf of a
group will often, perhaps always, help to legitimate that group.",7
Finding that the Government failed to meet its burden of
showing that its interest justified criminalizing otherwise protected
speech, the dissent concluded that it was uncertain whether the
67. Id. at 2730.
68. Id. at 2732 (Breyer,J. dissenting).
69. Id. at 2734 (emphasis in original).
70. Id. at 2735-37.
71. "There is no obvious way in which undertaking advocacy for political
change through peaceful means . .. is fungible with other resources that might be
put to more sinister ends in the way that donations of money, food, or computer
training are fungible." Id. at 2735 (emphasis in original). Following upon this
assertion, Breyer concludes that the Government must come up with some
evidence to support its claim that such aid is fungible. Id.
72. Id. at 2736-37.
73. Id. at 2736.
74. Id.
53492011]
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Government's interpretation of section 2339B was constitutional."
Like the majority's opinion, the dissent first considered whether
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance could decide the issue.
Unlike the majority's opinion, however, the dissent concluded that
it could." The dissent found that with a heightened mens rea
requirement, the statute would pass constitutional muster without
further consideration. In order to arrive at this interpretation,
the dissent read the statutory language such that the word
"knowingly" modified the word "material." Thus, a defendant
would have to know that he or she was providing the kind of
support that would be material to the cause of furthering an FTO's
illegal activities.8 This would be easy to prove when the defendant
was providing money or weapons since knowledge that these items
would further terrorist acts can be fairly inferred.8' But, where
humanitarian aid is at issue, the Government would have a higher
burden of showing that such aid did go to advance terrorist
.82objectives.
75. Id. at 2739.
76. See id. at 2717-18 (majority opinion), 2740 (Breyer,J. dissenting).
77. Id. at 2740 (Breyer, J. dissenting). The dissent argued that where "a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question
may be avoided" that the court "must" adopt this interpretation. Id. (quoting
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). This argument reduced the issue to
whether there would be an alternative interpretation that is "fairly possible." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2740.
80. Id. Specifically, the dissent phrased their interpretation as requiring that:
[T]he defendant would have to know or intend (1) that he is providing
support or resources, (2) that he is providing that support to a foreign
terrorist organization, and (3) that he is providing support that is material,
meaning (4) that his support bears a significant likelihood of furthering
the organization's terrorist ends.
Id. at 274041. The dissent argued that this interpretation is reasonable since the
terms at issue (training, expert advice or assistance, personnel, and service) all fall
under the definition of material support, and therefore "these activities fall within
the statute's scope only when they too are 'material.'" Id. at 2741.
81. Id. at 2741. The dissent recognized that certain forms of aid are
"inherently more likely to help an organization's terrorist activities, either directly
or because they are fungible in nature." Id. The dissent provided a list of such
items: currency, property, monetary instruments, financial securities, financial
services, lodging, safehouses, false documentation or identification, weapons,
lethal substances, or explosives, and the like. Id.
82. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Mens Rea: Protecting Due Process and the Freedom ofAssociation
1. The Majority Opinion: Punting the Scales Test
In Scales v. United States,83 Junius Irving Scales was convicted
under the Smith Act for his membership in the Communist Party.84
The Smith Act made it a felony to hold membership in any
organization that advocated the violent overthrow of the United
States government. Scales' Fifth Amendment challenge to the
statute argued that a statute that imposes a criminal sanction based
solely on the fact of mere membership, and nothing more, must
violate the due process clause. The Court agreed with Scales.
The Scales court held that the Smith Act must be interpreted to
mean that only "'active' members having also a guilty knowledge
and intent" could be successfully prosecuted. In other words, the
Court imposed a specific-intent requirement to bring the statute
into compliance with Fifth Amendment due process requirements.
The Court in Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder (HLP)
dismissed Scales as inapposite by interpreting Scales to hold that a
heightened mens rea is required only where the statute prohibits
membership in a group. But, by limiting Scales to its facts, the
HLP Court ignored the plain language of the Scales decision. In its
decision, the Scales Court wrote:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when
imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can
only be justified by reference to the relationship of that
status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity
(here advocacy of violent overthrow), that relationship
must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of
personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.90
By implicating both status and conduct, the Scales court
expressly contemplated situations where some type of conduct
83. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
84. Id. at 205.
85. Id. at 206 n.1.
86. Id. at 225.
87. Id. at 228.
88. Id. at 228.
89. Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010).
90. Scales, 367 U.S. at 224-25.
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beyond mere membership was the basis for prosecution.
Moreover, historically the judiciary has applied Scales to situations
involving "the furnishing of personnel, training, and services" to
organizations engaged in illegal activity as well as to statutes which
criminalize more than mere membership.9'
Furthermore, the Scales holding did not require that the
conduct at issue be protected as speech or association under the
First Amendment. It was not the character of the conduct at issue,
but rather the possibility that a statute would impute guilt to an
actor vicariously that specifically troubled the Court. The Court
treated the First Amendment and Fifth Amendment attacks on the
Smith Act entirely separately.9 ' In addressing the First Amendment
concerns, the Court considered whether the statute overly
constrained the right of association, impermissibly criminalizing
associational activity that does not further illegal ends. But, in
addressing the Fifth Amendment arguments, the Court never
stated that its analysis under due process only applied to protected
speech. Under this due process analysis, the Court was concerned
with membership as a measure of whether such status is sufficiently
substantial to qualify as illegal activity since this is what the
defendant in Scales was accused of." Thus, the Court's concern
about membership is not whether a member's First Amendment
rights are being safeguarded, but whether there is a sufficient level
91. In Hellman v. United States, 298 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1961) the 9th Circuit
overturned a conviction under the Smith Act where the defendant was organizing
new members, teaching Communism, and soliciting contributions. Id. And, in
Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2001) the Ninth Circuit applied Scales to
hold a statute unconstitutional which provided that tenants could be evicted for
illegal drug activity that was going on in the household but without their
knowledge.
92. The Scales court in its Fifth Amendment analysis is most concerned with at
what point conduct might rise to the level of criminality. The Court stated:
It may indeed be argued that such assent and encouragement do fall
short of the concrete, practical impetus given to a criminal enterprise
which is lent for instance by a commitment on the part of a conspirator
to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as distinguished
from a conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal enterprise by
the very fact of his membership without thereby necessarily committing
himself to further it by any act or course of conduct whatever.
Scales, 367 U.S. at 227-28.
93. Id. at 224-30.
94. Id. at 229.
95. Id. at 224-28. In fact, the Scales Court stated that its examination would be
made "independently of the claim made under the First Amendment." Id. at 225.
96. Id.
5352 [Vol. 37:5
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of personal guilt in mere membership or in conduct not intended
to further an organization's illegal aims. Therefore, the HLP
Court's argument that Scales is inapposite because Scales only dealt
with the right of mere membership missed the mark.
Additionally, the HLP Court's argument that the plain
language of section 2339B does not support the heightened mens
rea interpretation is antithetical to the traditional common law
rule. It is axiomatic that for a defendant to be held guilty of a
criminal offense, he or she must be held individually culpable.
"[T]he Court routinely presumes as a matter of statutory
construction that Congress intends to include a mens rea element
in its criminal statutes."98 And, this interpretation stands to reason,
since without some mens rea requirement, a person may be
culpable merely for his or her proximity to illegal conduct,
implicating not only due process, but also associational rights
protected by the Constitution.
2. The Dissent: Skirting the Analysis
Having removed the impediments to a judicial
reinterpretation of section 2339B to include a heightened mens rea
requirement, what should that requirement be? The Scales test
examines the "quantum of [the defendant's] participation in the
organization's alleged criminal activity."" Where there is only a
97. Yaster, supra note 10, at 1356. However, it is true that not all crimes
contain a scienter or mens rea requirement. Certain "public welfare offenses" are
crimes of strict liability, but as such are "limited and disfavored." Jonakait, supra
note 2, at 875 (citing U.S. v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437-38
(1978)). According tojonakait:
Such crimes, often labeled public welfare offenses, usually concern
dangerous products or items that are often subject to extensive
regulation in the interest of public safety. Such crimes can dispense with
the normal mens rea requirements because those involved with
dangerous products can reasonably be expected to be aware of the
possibility of regulation.
Id. at 875.
98. Yaster, supra note 10, at 1357; see also, Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
600 (1994) (holding that in order to convict a defendant of illegal possession of an
automatic weapon the government had to show that the defendant knew the
weapon fired automatically).
99. Yaster, supra note 10, at 1360; see also Pendle, supra note 13, at 794 ("The
test requires a court to analyze the substantiality of the relationship between a
person's status or conduct and an organization's concededly criminal activity.").
Or, in the Scales Court's own words, a court must "analy[ze]. .. the relationship
between the fact of membership and the underlying substantive illegal conduct, in
order to determine whether that relationship is indeed too tenuous to permit its
5353201l]
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tenuous relationship between the person and the illegal activities of
the organization, a modicum of personal guilt or mens rea is
required."0 But, where the person's status or conduct is more
closely linked to the organization's illegal activities, evidence of
personal guilt is not required."o' The Scales court concluded that
the Smith Act required the government to show that a defendant
had a specific intent to further an organization's illegal aims
because as applied to the defendant in Scales the law imposed guilt
where there existed only a tenuous relationship between the
defendant's membership status and the illegal elements of the
organization. But, to take this to mean that all criminal statutes
lacking a mens rea requirement must include a specific-intent
requirement would be a misreading of the holding in the case.
The case actually proposed a test to be applied to the specific facts
of each case, not a categorical rule.
Because the Scales test requires the consideration of the facts
on a case by case basis, as applied to section 2339B and the HLP
plaintiffs, there is no reason to assume the results would be the
same as in Scales. While some donations of support would establish
a very tenuous relationship between the donor and the illegal
activities of the organization, such as a donation of textbooks for
school children, other donations could create a very real link
between terrorist activity and the donation, such as where a person
donates weapons or bomb-making materials. It might also be said
that readily fungible donations, like cash, could also serve a strong
link between the donor and the illegal activities of the
organization, particularly where the donor is aware of the fact that
the organization is involved in terrorism.
An analogous situation in criminal law is the conspiracy
doctrine. In fact, the Scales court used an analogy to conspiracy in
its analysis of the Smith Act. Normally, to be convicted of
conspiring to commit a crime, the defendant must have had the
use as the basis of criminal liability. Scales, 367 U.S. at 226.
100. Scales, 367 U.S. at 226.
101. Id. at 226-27. The Scales Court provides an example of a person who is a
member of an organization that is known to engage in illegal activities. In this
scenario, the Court stated:
[W]e can perceive no reason why one who actively and knowingly works
in the ranks of that organization, intending to contribute to the success
of those specifically illegal activities, should be any more immune from
prosecution than he to whom the organization has assigned the task of
carrying out the substantive criminal act.
Id.
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intent to further the group's illegal undertaking. o2 But, in limited
circumstances, a defendant may be found guilty of conspiracy
merely upon knowledge that he or she was dealing in something
that is subject to extensive government regulation. For example,
where a defendant knowingly supplies a restricted narcotic, specific
intent to further an organization's illegal ends can be inferred.10 4
But, such intent may only be inferred where there is evidence of
"prolonged cooperation" with the organization, or where the actor
had a "stake in the venture.' 0o Similarly, section 2339B proposes to
restrict goods and. services that are supplied to a limited number of
highly regulated organizations. Thus, by analogy to conspiracy
doctrine, "when donations of support have been of such significant
quantity or such inherently suspicious or nefarious character to
suggest the donor's cooperation with, or stake in, the
organization's terrorist activities, proof of the defendant's
knowledge would be sufficient even under a strong interpretation
of Scales. "
Arguably, the dissent proposes this "quantum of participation"
test from Scales, although it skips over the analysis to get there.
Justice Breyer stated that when the word "material" is read to
modify "support," the statute "can be read to require the
Government to show that the defendant knew that the
consequences of his acts had a significant likelihood of furthering
the organization's terrorist, not just its lawful, aims.' 0o Breyer went
on to add that when the donor provides truly fungible forms of
aid, o0 evidence of such donations will prove a sufficient basis for a
successful prosecution.1on Not so, however, where "support consists
of pure speech or association.,,"o In Breyer's terms, a conviction on
the basis of pure speech is unconstitutional because it conflicts with
102. Yaster, supra note 10, at 1380.
103. Id. at 1380-81.
104. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 713 (1943) (holding that a
defendant may be successfully prosecuted for knowingly supplying illegal narcotics
since in such circumstances specific intent to further the illegal ends of a
conspiracy can be inferred).
105. Yaster, supra note 10, at 1383 (citing Direct Sales Co., 319 U.S. at 713).
106. Id. at 1383.
107. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 at 2741 (2010)
(Breyer,J. dissenting).
108. See supra text accompanying note 81 (listing items which J. Breyer
concluded were "fungible").
109. Holder, 130 S.Ct. at 2741 (Breyer,J. dissenting).
110. Id.
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the First Amendment, but arguably according to Scales, it also runs
afoul of the Fifth Amendment since pure speech is too tenuous a
connection between the speaker and the organization's illegal
activities. Thus, implicitly at least, Breyer was taking into account
the "quantum" of the defendant's relationship to the illegal
activities of the terrorist organization as required under Scales.
Accordingly, the dissent's test not only conforms to constitutional
requirements, but also seems consistent with precedent.
B. Overbreadth Doctrine-A Missed Opportunity?
Notwithstanding precedent, the majority of the Court in HLP
disregarded the argument that section 2339B required the Court to
infer a heightened mens rea. In eschewing the principle of
constitutional avoidance, the Court confronted the constitutional
questions head on. Yet, the Court ignored the plaintiffs'
overbreadth challenge almost entirely.
The overbreadth doctrine provides that even where the
government has a compelling interest in regulating speech or
association, the First Amendment requires that the regulation be
narrowly drawn so as to impose the least amount of restrictions on
constitutionally protected speech and conduct as possible.
Proper overbreadth analysis requires inquiry into whether (1) "the
statute provide [s] an unlimited and indiscriminate sweep that
encroaches upon . .. First Amendment right[s]; (2) if so, is the
government's purpose legitimate and substantial; and (3) even if
[so] .. . can its purpose be achieved more narrowly?""'
The majority of the Court never reached the issue of
overbreadth, although arguably that issue was before them. The
plaintiffs argued that, "the four challenged provisions are so
profoundly indeterminate that they are facially overbroad as well as
vague.""'3  Having merged their vagueness and overbreadth
arguments, the plaintiffs apparently had not punted their First
Amendment overbreadth challenge, but merely argued that the
fact that the provisions were vague made possible the overly broad
application of the statute to otherwise protected speech.'14 The
111. Gustavo Otalvora, From Stalin to Bin Ladin: Comparing Yesteryear's Anti-
Communist Statutes with the Public Employer Provision of the Ohio Patriot Act, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1303, 1312 (2010).
112. Id. at 1313-14.
113. Reply Brief for Humanitarian Law Project, supra note 41, at 18.
114. Id. at 18-19.
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Court, however, disagreed. In the majority's view, the statutory
provisions were not vague, and since the plaintiffs had linked their
vagueness argument to their overbreadth argument, both
arguments failed.'1 1 This appears contrary to precedent.
Historically, the Court has merged the vagueness and overbreadth
challenges and held that where a statute overreaches into protected
116
speech, a heightened vagueness standard is applicable.
Since the Court never reached the merits of an overbreadth
challenge, future plaintiffs arguably could raise this issue in a
separate challenge to the statute.' A line of cases dealing with
Cold War-era statutes struck down attempts to curb support for
communist organizations because in regulating both illegal and
protected activities the statutes were not drawn narrowly enough to
avoid impermissibly infringing on First Amendment rights.
However, in addressing overbreadth challenges to Section 2339B in
115. Holder, 130 S.Ct. at 2719. The Court wrote, "[u]nder a proper analysis,
plaintiffs' claims of vagueness lack merit. Plaintiffs do not argue that the material-
support statute grants too much enforcement discretion to the Government. We
therefore address only the [notice issue]." Id. at 2719-20. But see Reply Brief for
Humanitarian Law Project, supra note 41, at 18-19 (arguing that vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines have often been analyzed together by the Court).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) ("Although
ordinarily '[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others,'
we have relaxed that requirement in the First Amendment context, permitting
plaintiffs to argue that a statute is overbroad because it is unclear whether it
regulates a substantial amount of protected speech."); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 551 (1965) (holding statute facially invalid because it is "unconstitutionally
vague in its overly broad scope"); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982) (holding heightened vagueness standard
applies where statute implicates free speech).
117. The Court limited its holding to the facts of HLP, raising the possibility
that on different facts a new challenge could be brought. The Court stated, "[a]ll
this is not to say that any future applications of the material-support statute to
speech or advocacy will survive First Amendment scrutiny." Holder, 130 S.Ct. at
2730.
118. Otalvora, supra note 111, at 1312-13. The Court repeatedly held that
where constitutionally protected activities fall within the scope of a criminal
statute, that statute must be narrowly drawn to avoid too much infringement on
constitutional rights. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 259-60, 262
(1967) (holding a statute unconstitutional because it swept "indiscriminately
across all types of association with Communist-action groups," without
distinguishing between the defendant's degree of membership); Whitehill v.
Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 56, 62 (1967) (holding a Maryland statute unconstitutional
because it forced teachers to sign an oath and swear they were not members of
certain groups); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (holding an Arkansas
statute unconstitutional for overly interfering with the rights of association of
teachers).
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other cases, the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have
expressed the view that the material support statute is not overly
broad because it does not criminalize mere membership in an
FTO. 119 But, given recent Supreme Court decisions equating
donations with pure political speecho there may be a viable
argument to be made that the material support statute
impermissibly prohibits the types of speech and conduct that
receive the strongest protections.
V. CONCLUSION
If ever strict scrutiny was "strict in theory, fatal in fact" it
certainly was not so in the minds of the majority in HLP. Without a
doubt, combating terrorism is a compelling interest that begs
urgency and diligent effort. Few would question that the current
climate of hostilities asks that U.S. citizens make certain sacrifices.
But, how far are we willing to go? The majority of the Court seems
to place no limit on how far it would allow the government to go so
long as any infringement of fundamental rights are justified by
assertions of necessity recorded in Congressional findings and
affidavits from the executive. No further inquiry is required. The
majority ignored precedent requiring, at a minimum, that the
Government show more than a tenuous, membership-based
connection between a person's acts and a group's illegal acts in
order to conform both with the Due Process Clause and the First
Amendment.
However, this is likely not the end of litigation challenging
section 2339B. The Court's fact-specific interpretation of the
plaintiffs' arguments could permit future litigants to bring a
challenge on slightly different facts. Moreover, the Court's opinion
probably did not foreclose a challenge on overbreadth grounds,
since this issue was treated as though it was not before the Court.
119. Otalvora,supra note 111, at 1313.
120. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 925 (2010)
(holding that a ban on corporate expenditures for the promotion of certain
political candidates during an election was unconstitutional since the government
cannot suppress political speech under the First Amendment.) In Citizens United,
the Court stated, "political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it,
whether by design or inadvertence. Laws that burden political speech are 'subject
to strict scrutiny,' which requires the Government to prove that the restriction
'furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.'"
Id. at 898 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449,
464 (2007)).
5358 [Vol. 37:5
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [2011], Art. 28
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss5/28
EDITORIAL CARTOON COMPETITION WINNER:
RUNNER UP, ERIC LAKINt
f Undergraduate editorial cartoonist, The Daily Bruin, University of
California, Los Angeles.
23
Zerwas: No Strict Scruting—The Court's Deferrential Position on Material
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
$8
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [2011], Art. 28
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss5/28
